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Abstract
In this paper, the impact of increased consumer information on brand
name and generic pharmaceutical prices is analyzed both theoretically
and empirically. The theoretical results show that an increase in informa-
tion is likely to reduce the price of brand name pharmaceuticals, while the
results regarding generics are less clear. In the empirical part of the paper,
the introduction of the substitution reform in the Swedish pharmaceuti-
cals market in October 2002 is used as a natural experiment regarding the
eﬀects of increased consumer information on pharmaceutical prices. The
results clearly show that the reform has lowered the price of both brand
name- and generic pharmaceuticals.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In this paper, a reform of the Swedish pharmaceutical market will be used to
study the eﬀects of increased consumer information about price diﬀerences in
medically equivalent treatments (branded and generic drugs) on the pricing
policy of pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
There is a vast theoretical literature concerning the eﬀects of imperfect con-
sumer information on pricing and market structure. Stigler (1961) showed that
imperfect information creates market power and prices above competitive levels;
while Diamond (1971) showed that if information is costly, this could lead to an
equilibrium where ﬁrms charged the monopoly price rather than the competitive
price. In addition, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) presented a model where low-cost
stores had higher sales because low search cost individuals actively seek them
out, while only high search cost individuals patronized the high cost stores.
They also established that costly information could lead to market equilibria
where the law of one price does not hold. In a related study, Stiglitz (1979)
showed that under imperfect information, increasing the number of ﬁrms could
actually reduce competition and increase prices.
Turning to theoretical models of pharmaceutical markets, Frank and Salkever
(1992) have shown that an increase in the number of informed consumers will
lead to lower brand name pharmaceutical prices. Also, based on a conjecture by
Grabowski and Vernon (1992) that an increase in the number of informed cus-
tomers (i.e. cross-price sensitive consumers) would increase the negative impact
of entry on brand name pharmaceutical prices, Frank and Salkever showed that,
theoretically, this is not necessarily the case. Our theoretical model, presented
in section 3 below, will be a modiﬁed version of the Frank and Salkever model.
Only a few empirical tests of how consumer information aﬀects prices in
health care markets exist. Pauly and Satterthwaite (1981) studied how the
market for a reputation good (i.e. a good that is marketed mainly through
recommendation from friends, relatives or colleagues) such as physician services
was aﬀected by additional primary care physicians entering the market. Since
this increases consumer search costs in their model, this will also make each pri-
mary care physicians demand curve become less elastic, leading to higher prices.
In a more recent paper, Sorensen (2000) studied the relationship between imper-
fect consumer information and prices among prescription pharmaceuticals. The2 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
data were collected from pharmacies in upstate New York, and the price diﬀer-
ences among medically equivalent prescriptions were found to be large. In fact,
on average the highest listed price exceeded the cheapest available alternative
by as much as 50 percent. In addition, the results give support to a consumer
search cost model, since frequently purchased pharmaceuticals had both lower
markups and lower price diﬀerences when compared to one-time prescription
pharmaceuticals.
In October 2002, the Swedish pharmaceuticals market was reformed. The
reform (Lag 2002:160) required that pharmacists inform the consumers if there
are substitute products available, as well as that the cheapest available substi-
tute product would be provided within the Swedish pharmaceuticals insurance
system. The reform also required that thec o n s u m e r sa r eg i v e nt h eo p p o r t u n i t y
to buy the prescribed pharmaceutical product instead of the cheapest available
product, paying the diﬀerence in price between the products themselves. This
means that under the new regulations, consumers have more information about
the price diﬀerence between the prescribed (often brand name) product and
the cheapest available (generic) alternative than they had prior to the reform.
As such, the introduction of the substitution reform can be seen as a natural
experiment where consumers are given more information about price diﬀerences
between identical medical treatments.
In this paper, the introduction of the substitution reform will be used to
empirically measure the eﬀects of increased consumer information on brand
name and generic pharmaceutical prices. Our theoretical model shows that an
increase in information is likely to reduce the price of brand name pharmaceuti-
cals, but the results regarding generics are less clear. Hence, the main hypothesis
to be tested is if the substitution reform, by increasing consumer information
about pharmaceutical prices and available generic substitutes, has decreased
the price of brand name and/or generic pharmaceuticals. In addition, we will
test whether the possible price response diﬀers between brand name and generic
drugs and also study additional heterogeneity in the reform-eﬀect, suggested by
the theoretical model. The empirical analysis is performed using monthly data
on pharmaceuticals sold January 2001 to October 2006.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways; ﬁrst,
contrary to previous theoretical studies, our theoretical model analyses how
both brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals are aﬀected by increased con-Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 3
sumer information. Second, previous studies of the introduction of substitution
reforms in European pharmaceuticals markets (e.g. Buzzelli et al., 2006) use
pharmaceutical price indexes as their dependent variable. As such, they cannot
discriminate between those changes in the pharmaceutical price index caused
by changed pharmaceutical prices and those caused by changed quantities for
brand name- and generic drugs. The use of pharmaceutical price indexes also
makes it impossible to study heterogeneity in the reform-eﬀect among brand
name- and generic drugs. The introduction of the substitution reform and the
use of individual pharmaceutical price data in our paper make it possible to
study both how pharmaceutical prices were aﬀected by the reform, as well as
possible heterogeneity in the reform-eﬀect among brand name pharmaceuticals
and generics. The main ﬁnding from this paper is that the reform has lowered
the price of both brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals.
The next section describes the substitution reform, while section 3 presents
the theoretical model, based on the Frank and Salkever model. Section 4
presents the data and the empirical model to be used in this study, as well
as the results from the estimation of the empirical model. Finally, in section 5
the paper’s conclusions are presented.
2 The substitution reform
The substitution reform came into eﬀect on October 1, 2002. As mentioned
above, the reform required that pharmacists inform the consumers if there are
substitute products available, as well as that the cheapest available generic
substitute product (which is considered to be a perfect substitute for the brand
name drug by the Swedish Medical Products Agency, SMPA) would be provided
within the Swedish pharmaceuticals insurance system. The pharmacist must
also inform the consumers that they can buy the prescribed pharmaceutical
product instead of the generic product if they pay the diﬀerence in price between
the products themselves. As such, the new regulations provide consumers with
more information about the price diﬀerence between the prescribed product
and the cheapest available generic alternative then before. Finally, the reform
requires that pharmacists substitute the prescribed pharmaceutical product to
the cheapest available generic (or parallel imported product) in cases when
neither the prescribing physician prohibits the switch for medical reasons, nor4 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
the consumer chooses to pay the price diﬀerence between the prescribed and
the generic alternative. In cases where the physician prohibits the switch due
to medical reasons the consumer is still reimbursed.1
The reform was supposed to lower pharmaceutical costs in two diﬀerent
ways; directly, as more expensive pharmaceuticals were exchanged for cheaper
generic copies, and indirectly through increased price competition. The latter
eﬀect will be studied in this paper using data from the county of Västerbotten,
Sweden. Pharmaceuticals are sold through a nation wide government owned
monopoly, the National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies (NCSP), which is
required to charge a uniform price for each pharmaceutical product in Sweden.
In addition, for a product to be included in the Swedish pharmaceuticals insur-
ance system the price charged by the pharmaceutical ﬁrms from the NCSP has
to be authorized by the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Board (PBB).
Before the substitution reform, a reference price system introduced in Jan-
uary 1993 was in eﬀect. Under that system, the Swedish National Social In-
surance Board (SNIB) set a reference price equal to 110 percent of the price
of the cheapest available generic product, and all costs exceeding this reference
price were to be borne by the consumer (RFFS 1992:20, 1996:31). The eﬀects
of the reference price system on pharmaceutical prices have been analyzed pre-
viously (see e.g. Aronsson et al., 2001; Bergman and Rudholm, 2003). The
results from Aronsson et al. showed that the introduction of the reference price
system reduced brand name pharmaceutical prices for pharmaceuticals where
generic substitutes were available at the introduction of the system. However,
Bergman and Rudholm found that the Swedish reference price system had been
eﬀective only for those products which already faced generic competition at the
introduction of the system. Before the system was introduced, generic entrants
typically set prices far below the brand name product, without capturing more
than a relatively small fraction of the market (Aronsson et al.). When the sys-
tem was introduced, the brand name manufacturers were forced to lower their
prices to a level close to that of the generics, in order for consumers to be fully
reimbursed. However, after the system had been introduced, generic entrants
had incentives to set prices in order to stay within the 10 percent limit set by
the reference price system (Bergman and Rudholm).
1During the ﬁrst 15 months after the reform, physicians chose to deny the exchange in 3
percent of the cases (National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies et al., 2004).Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 5
3 Theoretical model
To study the eﬀects of increased information on brand name and generic drugs,
we turn to the model developed by Frank and Salkever (1992). We modify their
model to be able to analyze the price of generics as well. In a speciﬁcm a r k e t
there is one brand name ﬁrm, b,a n dn − 1 generic ﬁrms, that all produce one
pharmaceutical product each and have identical cost functions. Since there are
consumers who are willing to pay the diﬀerence in price between the brand name
and generic pharmaceutical in order to get the brand name pharmaceutical, it
will be assumed that consumers actually view the brand name and the diﬀerent
generic drugs as close substitutes, instead of perfect ones.2 Therefore, a ﬁrm
cannot get all informed costumers by setting their price slightly below the others.
The consumers only diﬀer in their preferences for the drugs and the information
they have about prices.
Several studies have reported that brand name products, in spite of consid-
erably higher prices than the available generic substitutes, are able to maintain
dominant positions in terms of market shares (e.g. Bond and Lean, 1977; Stat-
man, 1981; Hurwitz and Caves, 1988). For the Swedish pharmaceuticals market,
Aronsson et al. (2001) reported that some of the products in their study main-
tained market shares in excess of 80 percent even though they had a more than
50 percent markup over the price of the available generic substitutes. As such,
the principal diﬀerence between a generic ﬁrm and the brand name ﬁrm in our
theoretical model is that the brand name ﬁrm will be assumed to have a higher
market share compared to the generic ﬁrm at equal prices, due to consumer
preferences for the brand name product. Due to its high market share, we as-
sume that a change in the brand name price will have a signiﬁcant impact on
the generic prices and treat the brand name ﬁrm as a Stackelberg leader which
incorporates the generic ﬁrms’ price-responses in its pricing decision.3 It will
also be assumed that the generic ﬁrms take all other prices as given in the sense
that they do not take into account how their pricing decisions will aﬀect that
of other pharmaceutical ﬁrms. As such, the analysis will start by analyzing the
pricing decision made by the generic ﬁrms.
2During the ﬁrst 15 months after the reform, consumers chose to deny the exchange in
approximately 5 percent of the cases (Apoteket AB et al., 2004).
3The qualitative results hold even if the brand name ﬁrm is treated as a Nash player
towards the generic ones.6 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
The demand function for generic product i is written
Qi = αDI
i(Pi,P j,P b,n)+( 1− α)DUI
i (Pi,n).( 1 )
α is the share of informed consumers in the market, who know the prices of
all available pharmaceutical products, and (1 − α) is the share of uninformed
consumers in the market, who only know the price of the drug they are buy-
ing. αDI
i and (1 − α)DUI
i represent the demand facing the generic ﬁrm i from
informed and uninformed consumers, respectively. Pi,P j and Pb are the prices
of the generic drug i, all other generic drugs and the brand name drug, respec-
tively, which together with the number of pharmaceutical products, n,a ﬀect the
demand for the generic drug i from the informed consumers. The demand from
the uninformed consumers is not aﬀected by other prices, but by the number of
pharmaceutical products.
The generic ﬁrm i’s proﬁt function is written
πi = Pi ∗ [αDI
i (Pi,P j,P b,n)+( 1− α)DUI
i (Pi,n)]
−Ci(αDI
i (Pi,P j,P b,n)+( 1− α)DUI
i (Pi,n)),( 2 )
where Ci(Qi) is the ﬁrm’s cost function. The marginal cost is assumed to be
positive and constant.4 The ﬁrm chooses Pi to maximize the proﬁt, which gives



















i(Pi,P j,P b,n)+( 1− α)DUI
i (Pi,n)=0 .( 3 )
The price function of generic product i can thus be written Pi(α,n,Pj,P b).A l l
generic ﬁrms are assumed to face identical demand and cost functions and will
t h e r e f o r es e tt h es a m ep r i c e ,w h i c hw ed e n o t eb yPg. The best response function
of generics is written Pg(α,n,Pb).
Accordingly, the brand name producer’s demand function is written
Qb = αDI
b(Pb,P g(α,n,Pb)) + (1 − α)DUI
i (Pb,n),( 4 )
4This assumption is not crucial for the qualitative results from the model, but it simpliﬁes
expressions and makes them easier to interpret.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 7



























b(Pb,P g(α,Pb,n)) + (1 − α)DUI
b (Pb,n)=0 .( 5 )
Equation (3) and equation (5) diﬀer from each other since the brand name ﬁrm
get higher sales compared to a generic ﬁr mw i t ht h es a m ep r i c ea n db e c a u s et h e
brand name ﬁrm act as a Stackelberg leader. If
∂Pg
∂Pb > 0,5 which we assume,
either one of these diﬀerences guarantee that the brand name ﬁrm will set a
higher price than the generic ones.
3.1 The eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei ni n f o r m a t i o n
The eﬀect of an increase in the share of informed consumers (i.e. an increase in


































We assume that the second order suﬃcient condition for a maximum, δi < 0,
is fulﬁlled (Appendix 2). The mark-up, Pi − dCi
dQi, is positive. The second term
in the numerator, and therefore the ﬁrst product, will be negative if the own
price response of informed consumers is greater than the own price response of
uninformed consumers, which is a reasonable assumption. The next two terms
show how the total demand for generic i is aﬀected by a change in the share of
informed consumers. These terms are jointly positive since informed consumers
are more likely to patronize the generic product i due to price information, while
consumers in the uniformed group choose the pharmaceutical product closest
to their personal preferences, brand name or generic.
The ﬁnal terms show the indirect eﬀect on Pi of an increase in α,w o r k i n g
through the eﬀect of α on other prices. The terms dPi
dPj and dPi
dPb,w h i c ha r e
discussed in more detail in Appendix 1, are assumed to be positive. The last
two terms therefore imply that a generic ﬁrm is more likely to reduce its price
5See Appendix 1 for a discussion of these assumptions.8 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
if the brand name price is reduced and that any price change of a generic ﬁrm,
due to symmetry, is enhanced by the price changes of the other generic ﬁrms.
To sum up, the direct eﬀect of an increase in the share of informed consumers
on the generic prices is not clear cut. The ﬁrst product works in the direction
of lower prices as long as the consumer becomes more price sensitive when
information about prices increases. On the other hand, the next two terms in
the numerator, DI
i and DUI
i , together have a positive eﬀect on the price change
for generic product i. Finally, the sign of the indirect eﬀect depends on the
eﬀect of α on the brand name price, to which we now will turn.




































dQb is positive and larger than the mark-up for a generic ﬁrm. The second
term will be negative if the own price response of informed consumers is greater
than the own price response of uninformed consumers, which seems reasonable
to assume. However, this term will be less negative than the corresponding one
for the generic ﬁrms due to the brand name ﬁrm’s Stackelberg role. The next
two terms show how the total demand for the brand name product is aﬀected
by a change in the share of informed consumers. Since informed consumers are
aware of the cheaper generic substitutes, they buy less from the brand name
ﬁrm than uninformed consumers and the sum of these terms will be negative.
That is, the brand name ﬁrm, unlike the generic companies, loses sales if there
is an increase in the share of informed consumers, which reduces the revenue
loss from price reductions. Therefore, this works for a higher price reduction
for brand name drugs compared to the generic drugs. The sign of the ﬁnal term
depends on the price change of the generic ﬁrms.
Given our assumptions, the theoretical model shows that it is likely that
the substitution reform, which is our exogenous measure of increased consumer
information about pharmaceutical prices, will lead to price reductions for brand
name drugs while the predictions are less clear for the generic products. We
now turn to the task of empirically testing the predictions of our model, i.e.
that the prices of brand name (and perhaps also generic) pharmaceuticals will
be reduced by the substitution reform.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 9
4 The empirical analysis
4.1 Data and empirical speciﬁcation
The pharmaceutical prices in Sweden during the period January 2001 to Oc-
tober 2006 are extracted from a dataset provided by the County Council of
Västerbotten, Sweden. The data cover all prescription pharmaceuticals sold
in the county during the period and sums up to a total number of 15 million
prescriptions.
Only observations referring to pharmaceuticals considered to be exchange-
able within the substitution reform are relevant for this study. We identiﬁed
these observations by a two step procedure. First, we used a wide deﬁnition of
which pharmaceuticals that should be considered to be exchangeable within the
substitution reform. This wide deﬁnition is based on the three criteria speci-
ﬁed by the Medical Product Agency, namely that the diﬀerent pharmaceutical
products have the same active substance, are of the same form (pills, oral ﬂu-
ids, etc.) and that the packages are of similar size. In a second step, these
commodities were more carefully examined by manually comparing them to the
Medical Product Agency list over substitutable products published at the time
of the introduction of the reform. After this examination 4082 commodities,
in 856 diﬀerent exchange groups, are deﬁned to be substitutes according to the
regulations set out in the exchange reform. These commodities account for ap-
proximately 7 million prescriptions in our original sample. We can identify in
which month each prescription is sold, and there are thus a maximum of 70
observations for each commodity, 21 before the reform and 49 after, giving a
maximum number of observations of 285 740 (=4082*70). However, not all of
these pharmaceutical products are sold in Västerbotten each month, reducing
the actual number of observations to 126 904. Due to missing data for one or
more of our key variables, the ﬁnal sample consists of 105 587 observations.
Our dataset does not include information about which product that is the
brand name product. From the theoretical model we know that brand name
ﬁrms will distinguish themselves by setting higher prices than their competi-
tors. This is also supported by previous empirical studies (e.g. Aronsson et al.,
2001; Bond and Lean, 1977; Statman, 1981; Hurwitz and Caves, 1988). Thus,
Brand is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the pharmaceutical
has had the highest price in the exchange group both in the ﬁrst and third six10 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
months periods prior to the reform. The six month period is used to reduce the
problem of not all commodities being sold each month, and two examination
periods are used to reduce the risk of our labeling being aﬀected by temporary
price changes. We choose examination periods prior to the reform, since the
reform may reduce price diﬀerences between brand name and generic drugs,
making labeling based on periods after the reform less robust. In the 9 percent
of the cases where the pharmaceutical had the highest price in only one of these
periods, a closer examination was performed where a pharmaceutical was clas-
siﬁed as a brand name drug if there were only one producer not belonging to
the group of the most common generic producers in the Swedish market.6 The
remaining pharmaceuticals, where no apparent brand name producer could be
identiﬁed were all treated as generics.7
As stated earlier, the main purpose of this paper is to study the eﬀect of
an increase in consumer information due to the introduction of the substitution
reform on the prices of brand name and generic pharmaceuticals. Therefore,
our focus will be to achieve unbiased estimates of the reform-eﬀect. As such, we
use product-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to capture several of the eﬀects that according
to equations (3) and (5) can explain the diﬀerence in price levels between phar-
maceutical products, and focus our attention on changes in the prices caused by
changes in the shares of informed consumers, as described in equations (6) and
(7). The latter two equations reveal several variables which will inﬂuence the
reform-eﬀect. We will therefore take them as starting points to study hetero-
geneity in the reform-eﬀect as well. Since we are not able to model all diﬀerences
between the two equations, we estimate the models separately for brand name
products and generics, allowing the parameter estimates to diﬀer. However,
the speciﬁcation for the two groups will include the same variables. Below, we
therefore only discuss the speciﬁcations for one of the two groups, brand name
products.
From equation (7) we know that the eﬀect of an increase in α on the brand
6In Sweden, there are some producers that specialize in producing and selling generic
products in several of the substitution groups covered in this study. These are easily identiﬁed
in our dataset.
7All regressions have also been performed excluding these 9 percent of the cases. All
qualitative results from the estimations presented below are unchanged, and these results
have thus been excluded in order to save space.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 11
































The ﬁrst product on the right hand side includes the following four terms: the
markup over marginal cost, the diﬀerence in own price response of informed and
uninformed consumers, the second derivative of the brand name ﬁrm’s proﬁt
maximization problem, and the change in information due to the introduction
of the substitution reform. Our data allow us to study heterogeneity in the ﬁrst
and forth terms.8 First, the markup is assumed to be a linear function of our






= γ0 + γ1 lnmarkupi.( 9 )
lnmarkupi is the logarithm of the diﬀerence between the average price for
pharmaceutical product i in the pre-reform period and the minimum price in
the group of exchangeable products during that period.9 As such, this variable
is deﬁned for pharmaceutical i. Mathematical formulas used to calculate this
and other proxy variables are presented in Appendix 3. Second, the change in
information is written
dα = γ3dDt + γ4d(infog ∗ Dt), (10)
where D is an indicator variable taking the value one after the introduction of
the substitution reform, and infog is our proxy for the level of information avail-
able for consumers in exchange group g before the introduction of the reform.
This is deﬁned as the extra expenditure on pharmaceuticals in exchange group
g prior to the reform compared to the expenditure if the given quantity would
8We do not model any heterogeneity in the second and third term. This reduces the
number of interaction terms in our full model, but, similarly to the omission of interaction
terms later discussed in Appendix 5, this do not cause any bias.
9Using the minimum price in the group of exchangeable products as a proxy for marginal
cost is similar to the approaches adopted by Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and Rudholm
(2001). The logarithm is used since the dependent variable will also be in logarithmic form.
γ0 is included to capture the average of the diﬀerence between the minimum price and the
marginal cost.12 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
have been bought at the lowest price in the exchange group each month, mea-
sured in percent. Following Sorensen (2000), this measure is based on the notion
that if consumers systematically and over time pay more than necessary for a
given pharmaceutical within an exchange group, this reﬂects that consumers in
that group are less informed about prices of available generic substitutes than
in other groups, cet. par. The idea is that the change in the share of informed
consumers will be larger in markets with low initial information. Multiplication






∗ dα = γ0γ3dDt + γ0γ4d(infog ∗ Dt)
+γ1γ3(lnmarkupi ∗ dDt)
+γ1γ4[lnmarkupi ∗ d(infog ∗ Dt)]. (11)
In the second product in equation (8), our division of the sample in brand
name and generic pharmaceuticals in part controls for diﬀerences in the term
DI − DUI between pharmaceutical ﬁrms, and we do not model any remaining
heterogeneity in this term or in the second derivative, δb. What remains in the
second product is dα, which is measured as described above.
The third product in equation (8) shows that the change in the price of the
brand name producer can also be aﬀected by price changes of generic products,
caused by a change in the proportion of informed consumers. The eﬀect on the
generic prices in an exchange group mostly depends on the same variables as
the eﬀect on the brand name prices. In addition it depends on the markup of
the generic ﬁrms, which does not directly aﬀect the price change of the brand
name drug. To study whether this indirect eﬀect has any signiﬁcant eﬀect on
the brand name price, we therefore identify the term
dPg
dα by diff lnmarkupi,
which is the diﬀerence between the average markup in the exchange group g
and the markup for the brand name drug i.10 dα is measured as presented
above and we do not model any heterogeneity in the term dPb
dPg. Therefore, the
third product in equation (8) leaves us with the two additional interaction terms
diff lnmarkup ∗ D and diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D.
So far, only the variables of main interest for this study as presented in
equation (8) have been discussed, i.e. the variables that are supposed to capture
10This speciﬁcation for the logarithmic markup of the other drugs in the exchange group is
chosen in order to reduce the multicollinarity problem which otherwise could be a problem.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 13
the eﬀects of increased consumer information due to the substitution reform.
However, as can be seen in equation (5), the price will also depend on n,w h i c h
in our empirical model will be measured by the number of products sold in a
speciﬁc substitution group each month. The interaction terms n∗D and n∗info∗
D are included since the studies of Stiglitz (1979) and Frank and Salkever (1992)
indicated that the eﬀect on prices of the number of products can be aﬀected
by the share of informed consumers. A trend variable, Trend, is included in
order to account for possible common price trends. Finally, product-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects, θi,h a v eb e e ni n c l u d e di no r d e rt oa l l o wf o rd i ﬀerent intercepts for
the I diﬀerent products. The empirical speciﬁcation of the most general price
equation for brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals can thus be written
lnPriceit = β1Dt + β2(infog ∗ Dt)+β3(lnmarkupi ∗ Dt)
+β4(lnmarkupi ∗ infog ∗ Dt)+β5(diff lnmarkupi ∗ Dt)
+β6(diff lnmarkupi ∗ infog ∗ Dt)+β7nit + β8(nit ∗ Dt)
+β9(nit ∗ infog ∗ Dt)+β10Trendt + θi + εit. (12)
Descriptive statistics for all variables included in the empirical estimations
a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e1 . lnPrice is the logarithm of the price of the phar-
maceutical per one hundred deﬁned daily dozes expressed in Swedish crowns
in ﬁxed October 2006 prices.11 Comparing the descriptive statistics for brand
name and generic products, prices are roughly the same in the two groups.
However, as can be seen in Table 1, the markup over marginal cost is larger
for the sample containing brand name pharmaceuticals. Also, the descriptive
statistics for diff lnmarkup show that the competing products in an exchange
group on average have a lower price than the brand name product, while the
opposite is true for generics. As such, the similar prices for brands and generics
in Table 1 are due to a selection eﬀect, where generic ﬁrms to a large extent
have chosen to enter markets where the price is high. In addition, Table 1 shows
that the number of products is larger in the subsample for generics, as is the
level of previous information.
11Deﬁned daily doses (DDDs) is a World Health Organization measure of drug quantity.14 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Brands Generics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Price 1796.04 4359.74 1727.62 5137.14
lnPrice 6.64 1.18 6.39 1.31
D 0.67 0 .47 0.67 0 .47
info 7.98 22.51 12.90 81.63
lnmarkup 4.34 1.49 3.21 1.62
diff lnmarkup -0.28 0.59 0.97 1.12
n 2.35 1.44 3.29 1.56
Trend 33.99 20.05 33.09 19.45
info ∗ D 5.15 16.44 8.74 65.17
lnmarkup ∗ D 2.90 2.37 2.10 1.99
lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 26.46 101.03 32.65 371.04
diff lnmarkup ∗ D -0.18 0.51 0.69 1.08
diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D -1.10 9.34 13.91 99.60
n ∗ D 1.66 1.70 2.24 2.07
n ∗ info ∗ D 15.02 55.61 28.86 119.17
Nr. lnmarkup 47008 57861
Nr. 47121 58466
Products 873 1613
Nr. lnmarkup is the number of observation for the variables including lnmarkup or
diﬀ lnmarkup while Nr. is the number of observations for all other variables.
In equation (12), the following variables might be endogenous in the sense
that these variables correlate with the error term; info, lnmarkup, diff lnmarkup
and n. The available dataset does not contain any reasonable variables to be
used as instruments, hence endogeneity has to be addressed in some other way.
In order to be able to later conclude which result that might be driven by
endogeneity, we therefore discuss in Appendix 4 how the correlation between
t h ee r r o rt e r ma n dt h e s ev a r i a b l e sa r ee x p e c t e dt oa ﬀect the estimates of the
diﬀerent parameters. One should however keep in mind that these variables
are proxy-variables and that the estimators can therefore also be biased due to
measurement errors. Since bias in the estimators related to the variables men-
tioned above might aﬀect the estimated reform-eﬀect, we show in Appendix 5Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 15
how we can create a simple model, without the interaction variables, in order to
estimate the reform-eﬀect. In short, we show that the estimator for the reform
parameter, β1, will be an unbiased estimator of the average reform-eﬀect if the
interaction variables are left out from the speciﬁcation. The explanation is that
this estimator will capture the linear relationship between this variable and the
omitted interaction variables (e.g. Greene, 2003, Chapter 8).
Due to low variation in the number of products during the period of study,
the remaining possibly endogenous variable, n,m o s tl i k e l yo n l yh a sav e r y
limited inﬂuence on the estimated reform-eﬀect. During the study-period, it
is likely that the bulk of the correlation between n and the reform is due to
the eﬀect the reform has on the number of products, and that only a smaller
fraction of the correlation is due to exogenous variation in n. Therefore, not
controlling for n in the regression probably gives a better estimate of the total
reform-eﬀect.12 As such, the speciﬁcation which will be used to estimate the
average eﬀect of the reform for both brand name- and generic pharmaceutical
subsamples is written
lnPriceit = β1Dt + β10Trendt + θi + εit, (13)
where all included variables are exogenous. In all estimations, we use a Prais-
Winsten estimator which corrects for ﬁrst order serial correlation in the error
terms. In addition the error terms are allowed to be heteroskedastic and corre-
lated within ATC-groups.13
4.2 The adjustment process
Two circumstances give ﬁrms an incentive to gradually adjust their price after
the reform.14 First, there is incomplete information for ﬁrms about the reactions
of consumers and other ﬁrms to the reform. Second, price increases are rarely
12We will also estimate the basic model including the number of ﬁrms, n,i no r d e rt os t u d y
how this aﬀects the parameter estimates for the reform indicator variable.
13In the World Health Organization’s Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classiﬁca-
tion system, the drugs are divided into diﬀerent groups according to the organ or system
on which they act, and their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. In the
ATC-groups used here, drugs which share the same chemical substances are grouped together.
14Since pharmaceutical ﬁrms knew about the reform before it came into eﬀect in October,
2002, it is also possible that they started to adjust to the reform before this date. If this was
the case, we would expect to obtain larger estimates of the reform eﬀect if the estimations
were performed excluding observations from the months directly before the reform. To study16 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
allowed by the PBB. To capture this, we introduce the variable D/(t−R),w h e r e
R i st h et i m ef o rt h er e f o r m . W el e tt h ed e n o m i n a t o rb er a i s e dt ot h ep o w e r
µ,w h e r eµ is a parameter that will measure the curvature of the adjustment
process. As such, our basic empirical speciﬁcation including the adjustment
p r o c e s si sw r i t t e n
lnPriceit = β1Dt + β10Trendt + γ[Dt/(t − R)µ]+θi + εit. (14)
The models with adjustment are non-linear in the adjustment variable D/(t−
R). Since the models are nonlinear only due to one parameter, µ,i ti sc o n v e -
nient to estimate the models using a grid-search estimation strategy. We have
employed this method for each model setting µ to values ranging from 0 to 4
and then estimating the remaining parameters using a Prais-Winsten estima-
tor. Finally, likelihood values were used to discriminate between the diﬀerent
parameter values. The likelihood values were as well used to calculate 95 per-
cent conﬁdence intervals for the adjustment parameter, µ. As can be seen in
the notes to Tables 2 and 3, the conﬁdence intervals are not symmetric around
the point estimates. This is expected since a value of µ equaling zero lead to
an empirical model where the adjustment variable becomes equal to the reform
indicator variable.
4.3 Results
The results from the estimation for bra n dn a m ep r o d u c t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nT a -
ble 2. In order to study heterogeneity in the reform-eﬀect, we ﬁrst discuss the
results of the full model. For all variables that interact with other variables,
we only discuss the diﬀerential and the derivatives, respectively, which are eval-
uated at the mean value for each variable. The estimate of the diﬀerential
∆LnPrice/∆D from the full model shows that the average reduction in the
price of brand name pharmaceuticals due to the reform is approximately 2 per-
the importance of this possibility, we estimated all models excluding observations originating
from April 2002, when the law regarding the reform was passed by parliament, until October
2002, as well as from January 2002, when the bill was presented to parliament, until October
2002, respectively. This did not change the estimated reform eﬀect signiﬁcantly in any of
the estimated models, and in the majority of the cases the estimated reform eﬀect actually
became slightly smaller. Thus, these results indicate that the potential adjustments before
the reform were too small to have any important impact on our estimates.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 17
cent,15 and there is a signiﬁcant negative trend showing an average decrease in
pharmaceutical prices of 0.2 percent per month. From the theoretical model it
is expected that if consumers had a low level of information prior to the reform
(i.e. they systematically spent more money than necessary on the pharmaceu-
ticals they bought), the reduction in brand name price after the introduction
would be large. As can be seen in the lower half of Table 2, this is also the case.
However, this result must be interpreted with caution since the estimators of
the parameters for info may be negatively biased, as discussed in Appendix 4.
The point estimate of the interaction between the reform and lnmarkup
in Table 2 shows that the eﬀect of the reform was more pronounced if the
markup was large. However, this result is not statistically signiﬁcant at con-
ventional levels. Neither does the indirect eﬀect from equation (8) (as proxied
by diff lnmarkup in our empirical model) show any signiﬁcant impact on the
reform-eﬀect on pharmaceutical prices. The positive point estimate for this
variable may be explained by a positive correlation between this term and the
error terms. Finally, expanding the informed section of the market through
the introduction of the reform is found to increase the impact of the number
of products on pharmaceutical prices, while the number of products had no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the prices themselves.
We estimate the basic model with and without n in order to study if the
inclusion of this variable aﬀects the estimate of the reform-eﬀect. As can be seen
in Table 2, the parameter estimate for the number of products is not statistically
signiﬁcant, and the estimated reform-eﬀect is similar in size in both models. As
such, the reform-eﬀect does not seem to be aﬀe c t e db ya ne x c l u s i o no ft h e
number of products from the empirical model. The estimated reform-eﬀect in
these two models is slightly lower than in the full model, but still approximately
2 percent. There is also a negative time trend of 0.2 percent per month.
15Since the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, the exact change in price (in percent)
should for dummy variables be calculated using the formula 100∗[exp(β)−1]. However, since
the parameter estimates are small, using the exa c tf o r m u l ag i v e st h es a m er e s u l t sa su s i n gt h e
parameter estimates directly after rounding.18 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
Table 2. Brand name prices
Full Basic+n Basic Basic+adj.
D 22.32∗∗ -18.85∗∗∗ -18.86∗∗∗ -56.88∗∗∗
(11.13) (5.71) (5.70) (17.19)
Trend -2.01∗∗∗ -2.01∗∗∗ -2.01∗∗∗ -1.53∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.52) (0.50) (0.47)
n 1.60 -0.23
(1.36) (0.79)
info ∗ D -4.35∗
(2.48)
lnmarkup ∗ D -6.25∗∗
(2.94)
lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 0.71∗
(0.39)
diff lnmarkup ∗ D 1.98
(5.84)
diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 1.20∗
(0.67)
n ∗ D -2.28
(1.68)
n ∗ info ∗ D -0.04
(0.05)
D/(t − R) (γ) 38.14∗∗∗
(13.89)
D/(t − R) (µ) 354.00
(see note)
∆lnPrice/∆D -19.25∗∗∗ -18.85∗∗∗ -18.86∗∗∗ -42.40∗∗∗
(5.60) (5.71) (5.70) (12.25)
dlnPrice/d(info ∗ D) -1.73∗
(0.99)
dlnPrice/d(lnmarkup ∗ D) -0.62
(4.12)
dlnPrice/ 11.59
d(diff lnmarkup ∗ D) (7.37)




Sample size 47008 47121 47121 47121
Log likelihood 76724 76858 76859 76868
The reported values are the estimates multiplied by 1000. The regressions include product-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors, conditioned on the parameter, µ, are reported
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
The 95%-conﬁdence interval for µ is 0<µ<1086. The diﬀerential/derivatives are evaluated at
the mean for each variable. For D/(t-R)µ t h em e a ni nt h ep o s t - r e f o r mp e r i o di su s e d .Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 19
The results from the model with the adjustment variable show that the esti-
mated reform-eﬀect is larger than in the basic model, with an estimated average
price reduction during the study-period of 4 percent. One explanation for this
result is that including the adjustment parameter in the empirical speciﬁcation
changes the parameter estimate for the time trend from -0.20 to -0.15 percent
per month. The estimate for the reform dummy in this model, minus 6 per-
cent, can be interpreted as an estimate of the long run eﬀect of the reform.
The relatively large standard errors of this estimate, nearly 2 percent, is likely
caused by that the correlation between D and D/(t−R)µ is as high as 0.82 (e.g.
Greene, 2003, Chapter 4). According to a likelihood-ratio test, we can reject
the hypothesis of an instant adjustment at the time of the reform. We therefore
regard the estimates from the model with the adjustment variable as the more
reliable ones. The estimated reform-eﬀect for the model with adjustment is
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Figure 1. Brand name prices, estimated reform eﬀect with 95% CI20 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
Table 3. Generic prices
Full Basic+n Basic Basic+adj.
D 35.85∗∗∗ -11.02∗∗∗ -10.98∗∗∗ -135.85∗∗
(12.08) (1.70) (1.70) (55.49)
Trend -2.67∗∗∗ -2.75∗∗∗ -2.74∗∗∗ -2.01∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.76) (0.76) (0.62)
n 2.39∗∗∗ 0.75
(0.73) (0.57)
info ∗ D -1.37
(1.03)
lnmarkup ∗ D -8.03∗∗∗
(2.38)
lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 0.22
(0.17)
diff lnmarkup ∗ D -10.82∗∗∗
(4.16)
diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D 0.19
(0.14)
n ∗ D -2.50∗∗
(1.05)
n ∗ info ∗ D 0.01
(0.01)
D/(t − R) (γ) 125.20∗∗
(54.51)
D/(t − R) (µ) 101.00
(see note)
∆lnPrice/∆D -11.19∗∗∗ -11.02∗∗∗ -10.98∗∗∗ -41.34∗∗∗
(1.79) (1.70) (1.70) (14.38)
dlnPrice/d(info ∗ D) -0.44
(0.36)
dlnPrice/d(lnmarkup ∗ D) -5.13∗∗
(2.53)
dlnPrice/ -8.40∗∗
d(diff lnmarkup ∗ D) (4.09)




Sample size 57861 58466 58466 58466
Log likelihood 79506 79847 79843 79855
The reported values are the estimates multiplied by 1000. The regressions include product-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Robust standard errors, conditioned on the parameter, µ, are reported
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
The 95%-conﬁdence interval for µ is 0<µ<672. The diﬀerential/derivatives are evaluated at
the mean for each variable. For D/(t-R)µ the mean in the post-reform period is used.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 21
The results concerning generic pharmaceutical prices presented in Table 3
indicate an average price reduction due to the reform of one percent in all three
estimated models not including the adjustment variable. Further the estimates
show a negative price trend of 0.3 percent per month. As such, the reform-
eﬀect without adjustment is smaller in size for generics than for brand name
pharmaceuticals, while the price trend is larger. Neither of the diﬀerences is
statistically signiﬁcant.
The point estimates of the derivatives at the bottom of Table 3 show that
both high values of info and lnmarkup enhance the eﬀect of the reform as
expected, but the eﬀect of info is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. For generics, the parameter estimate for diff lnmarkup∗D, is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Our interpretation of this
is that a high markup prior to the reform of the competitors to generic i in-
creases the reform-eﬀect on the competitors, which in turns increases the need
for generic i to lower its price. As discussed in Appendix 4, potential endogene-
ity will cause the estimators related to this variable to be positively biased. As
such, this gives further support that the results are in line with our theoretical
model. Finally, as in the estimations concerning brand name pharmaceuticals,
expanding the informed section of the market through the introduction of the
reform is found to increase the impact of the number of products on pharmaceu-
tical prices, but the number of products had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the prices
themselves.
Turning to the results from our model including the adjustment process, the
results show that the reform-eﬀect is larger than in the basic models, with an
estimated average price reduction of 4 percent. As for brand name pharma-
ceuticals, a large part of the diﬀerence between the models can be explained
by the diﬀerence in the parameter estimates for the time trend. The point es-
timates for the parameter µ, indicate that the adjustment path for generics is
less curved than that for brands. However the divergence is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerent from zero. Further, the low value of µ results in a correlation
between D and D/(t −R)µ of 0.99, which increases the standard errors for the
parameter estimates related to these variables (e.g. Greene, 2003, Chapter 4).
The standard errors for the two estimates are over 5 percent and it is there-
fore not meaningful to discuss these estimates. However, the standard error for
the total reform-eﬀect is not inﬂuenced by the high correlation between D and22 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
D/(t − R)µ.A sf o rt h eb r a n dn a m es a m p l e ,w ec a nr e j e c tt h eh y p o t h e s i so fa n
instant adjustment at the time of the reform, and we therefore regard the esti-
m a t e sf r o mt h i sm o d e la st h em o s tr e l i a b l eo n e s . T h ee s t i m a t e dr e f o r m - e ﬀect
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Figure 2. Generic prices, estimated reform eﬀect with 95% CI
Taken together, the results indicate that the eﬀects of the reform on the
price paths of pharmaceutical products are more similar for brand and generic
products than expected, with an average price reduction due to the implemen-
tation of the reform of about 4 percent. These results could be compared to
previous studies concerning the eﬀects of substitution reforms on pharmaceu-
tical prices (e.g. Buzzelli et al., 2006). In comparison, their results show an
average price reduction of 3 percent after the implementation of the substitu-
tion reforms. It should, however, be noted that they use pharmaceutical price
index data, from 16 OECD countries, and that their estimate therefore is not
directly comparable to ours. Firstly, their results include the eﬀect that theConsumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 23
substitution reforms have had on the average price through a change in the
composition of drugs. Secondly, their estimate is an average for all drugs, not
only those directly aﬀected by the reforms. Further, the study by Buzzelli et
al. does not incorporate any adjustment process in the empirical speciﬁcation.
5 Discussion
As noted by Stiglitz (1979), it has long been recognized that imperfect con-
sumer information give ﬁrms some degree of monopoly power which leads to
prices above competitive levels. In addition, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) showed
that imperfect information could lead to market equilibria where homogenous
products are sold at diﬀerent prices. The situation in the Swedish pharmaceuti-
cals market before the introduction of the exchange reform was characterized by
both these phenomena, since close substitutes such as brand name- and generic
pharmaceutical products were sold at diﬀerent prices, and since especially brand
name products seemed to be priced well above long run marginal costs.
In this paper, the introduction of the Swedish substitution reform was used
as a natural experiment regarding the eﬀects of increased consumer information
on brand name and generic pharmaceutical prices. The main hypothesis to
be tested was if increased consumer information about pharmaceutical prices
and available generic substitutes due to the introduction of the substitution
reform had led to any reduction in the price of brand name and/or generic
pharmaceuticals. Another hypothesis to be tested was whether the possible
price response due to the introduction of the reform diﬀered between brand
name- and generic drugs.
First, following Frank and Salkever (1992), a theoretical model was set up
and the eﬀects of increased consumer information on pharmaceutical prices were
analyzed. The model indicated that an increase in information would, under
reasonable assumptions, led to a price reduction for brand name products, while
the results for generic pharmaceuticals were more ambiguous. Based on our
model, we also expected that the reduction in price would be large if the markup
over marginal cost was large and/or the market had been characterized by low
levels of information before the reform.
The results form the empirical part of the paper show an average reduction
in prices due to the reform of about 4 percent during the study-period, both for24 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals. In addition, the results give some
support for the reform-eﬀect being ampliﬁed for pharmaceuticals in markets
which had previously been characterized by low levels of consumer information,
as well as for pharmaceuticals which prior to the reform had high markups over
marginal cost.
We are also able to present tentative results regarding how an increase in
information will aﬀect the impact of the number of products on pharmaceutical
prices. The results presented in this paper are in line with Grabowski and
Vernon’s (1992) conjecture, that expanding the informed portion of the market
should increase the price lowering eﬀect of entry.
A ﬁnal point that needs to be discussed is how the brand name product
has previously been able to set a high price relative to the generic substitutes
without losing market share in the absence of the substitution reform. Stiglitz
(1979, p 340) suggests that “a ﬂow of ignorance can be maintained either by
entry of new ﬁrms or new individuals”. This could perhaps make it possible
for, for example, a brand name producer to price its product high relative to its
generic substitutes without losing market shares. To empirically investigate this
question is outside the scope of the present paper, but warrants future research.Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 25
Appendix 1. Indirect eﬀects




















The ﬁrst term includes d2DI
i /dPidPj, which describes how the slope of the
demand curve facing ﬁrm i is aﬀected by a change in the price of other gener-
ics. This term will be negative if a price reduction of other drugs changes the
marginal consumer to one who is less price sensitive than the previous one.
However, without knowing the speciﬁc form of the demand function, this term
cannot be signed. Since the drugs are substitutes, the second term is positive
and states that if the other prices are reduced, this will lower the demand for
drug i, which works for a price reduction of drug i. The price response of ﬁrm
i to a price change by the brand name ﬁrm and the price response of the brand
name ﬁrm to a price change by the generic ones can be written correspondingly.
Theoretically, we cannot rule out the possibility that the ﬁrst term is negative
and dominates the second one without making more explicit assumptions about
the demand function. In this paper we will assume that dPi
dPj > 0, dPi
dPb > 0 and
dPb
dPg > 0, without assuming a speciﬁc demand function. Among the possible
demand functions that would result in the positive derivatives that we assume,
a simple linear demand function like DI
i = d1 − d2Pi + d3Pj + d4Pb can be
mentioned.
Appendix 2. Second order conditions
The second order proﬁt maximization condition for generic ﬁrm i,i sw r i t t e n
d2πi/dP 2
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The corresponding expression for the brand name ﬁrm is written
d2πb/dP2
























































Appendix 3. Deﬁnitions of empirical measures
Denote the lowest observed price in exchange group g prior to the reform by
MinPriceg.L e t Salesit denote the sales of pharmaceutical i at period t and
let Salesgt be the corresponding for all pharmaceuticals in an exchange group.
























































That is, infog is deﬁned as the extra expenditure on pharmaceuticals in ex-
change group g prior to the reform compared to the expenditure if the given
quantity would have been bought at the lowest price in the exchange group
each month, measured in percent. lnmarkupi is measured as the logarithm ofConsumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 27
the diﬀerence between the average price for pharmaceutical product i in the
pre-reform period and the minimum price in the group of exchangeable prod-
ucts during that period. Finally, diff lnmarkupi is created by subtracting
lnmarkupi from the logarithm of the diﬀerence between the average and the
lowest price in one exchange group in the pre-reform period.
Appendix 4. Endogeneity
By recalling the deﬁnition of the variable info from Appendix 3, we see that this
variable depends on prices and therefore could be correlated with the error term
of equation (12). For brand name pharmaceuticals, an increase in the pre-reform
error terms will lead to an increase in info. The inclusion of product-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects operates so that the sum of the error terms for a pharmaceutical
during the whole study-period approaches zero. Therefore an increase in the
pre-reform error terms for a pharmaceutical will lead to a reduction in the
post-reform error terms for that pharmaceutical. For brand name ﬁrms, this
results in a negative correlation between the post-reform error terms and the
variable info, which will lead to negative bias in the estimators related to info.
(The correlation between info and the pre-reform error terms does not directly
aﬀect the bias, since info is only included in the model together with the reform
dummy.)
For the cheapest generic in an exchange group, an increase in the pre-reform
error terms will lead to a reduction in info, since the denominator will increase
proportionally more than the numerator. Therefore, the post-reform error term
of this pharmaceutical will be positively correlated with info. T h i si sa l s o
true for a uniform increase of the pre-reform error terms for all generics in an
exchange group. In the estimation for generic pharmaceuticals, the estimators
related to info are therefore likely to be positively biased.
All pre-reform error terms for a pharmaceutical have a positive eﬀect on
the variable lnmarkup, except the error term for the observation that aﬀect
MinPrice which has a negative eﬀect. Since in each exchange group there is
only one observation of MinPrice, and several observations of other pre-reform
prices, it is reasonable to expect the correlation between the lowest pre-reform
price and the post-reform error terms to be smaller in absolute size than the
correlation between all pre-reform prices and these error terms. The variable28 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
lnmarkup is therefore expected to be negatively correlated with the post-reform
error terms, making the estimators related to this variable negatively biased.
Since an increase in lnmarkup will lead to a decrease in diff lnmarkup,t h e
estimators related to the latter variable are positively biased.
The variable n is likely to be endogenous as well. An increase in the size of
the error term will, through its eﬀect on the price, lead to an increase in the
number of products. This will, in turn, lead to positive bias in the estimators
related to n. Including n in the estimation and treating it as exogenous might
also lead to a negative bias in the estimator of the reform-eﬀect. The reason
is that the reform is likely to have a negative eﬀect on prices, which in turn
could have a negative eﬀect on the number of products. If the number of
products is estimated to have a negative eﬀect on the prices, conditioning on it
will then work for an overestimation of the negative price eﬀect of the reform.
However, in addition the reform makes it more likely that a generic product
will be dispensed, increasing the probability of generic entry. Including n could
therefore also lead to an underestimation of the negative price eﬀect of the
reform.
Appendix 5. Measuring the reform-eﬀect
Denote the reform indicator variable by the vector D.L e tX(D) denote the it∗7
matrix for the interaction variables (info ∗ D), (lnmarkup ∗ D), (lnmarkup ∗
info ∗ D), (diff lnmarkup ∗ D), (diff lnmarkup ∗ info ∗ D), (n ∗ D) and
(n ∗ info ∗ D) and let γ be a vector of parameters related to these variables.
Ignore for simplicity that our model also includes the variables n and Trend
and product-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, θi. Then our structural model is written
lnPrice = X(D)γ + Dβ1+ε.
If this equation is estimated on reduced form, excluding X(D), the estimator






Now, in order to simplify things assume that there are observations in only
two periods, one before the reform (t =1 )a n do n ea f t e r( t =2 ), and let us
calculate what b1 represents if we omit the interaction terms from our empiricalConsumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ... 29





















where 0 and ε1 are vectors of zeros and error terms for the I pharmaceuticals
before the reform, and where 1, x1, x2...x7 and ε2 are vectors of ones, the
interaction variables and the error terms for the I pharmaceuticals after the














That is, if we exclude the interaction terms with the reform dummy, the average
eﬀect of these variables will still be captured by the parameter estimate of the
reform indicator variable.30 Consumer Information and Pharmaceutical Prices ...
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